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THE BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP
UNDER THE LOUISIANA COMMERCIAL LAWS
Ronald Hersbergen*
INTRODUCTION
Part 4 of Chapter 4 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws'
provides a body of rules governing the relationship between a
payor bank 2 and its customer.3 The Commercial Laws do not
attempt a comprehensive treatment of the customer-payor
bank relationship; the attempt, rather, is to provide for the
most important and historically troublesome aspects of that
relationship. The effect of these and other provisions of Chap-
ter 4 can, however, be varied by agreement under § 4-103. This
article will examine the bank-customer relationship under
the Commercial Laws and the viability of § 4-103.
THE BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE
COMMERCIAL LAWS
"Properly Payable" Items
The relationship between a bank and its customer under
the Commercial Laws 4 is based upon the agreement by the
* Associate Professor of Law, Drake University Law School; former
Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. LA. R.S. 10:4-401 to 4-407 (Supp. 1974). The source of the laws is the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1972 Official Text [hereinafter cited as UCC]. The
portions of the UCC adopted by La. Acts 1974, No. 92, i.e., articles 1, 3, 4 and
5, will hereinafter be generally called the "Commercial Laws." The "articles"
were termed "chapters" by the legislature to comport with the style of the
Louisiana Revised Statutes.
2. Defined in LA. R.S. 10:4-105(b) (Supp. 1974) as "a bank by which an
item is payable as drawn or accepted."
3. Defined in LA. R.S. 10:4-104(1)(a) (Supp. 1974) as "any person having
an account with a bank or for whom a bank has agreed to collect items. .. ."
4. In light of the stated purpose of the Commercial Laws, as provided in
LA. R.S. 10:1-102(2)(c) (1974), "to promote uniformity of the law among the
various jurisdictions," the decisions of other jurisdictions construing the
adopted portions of the UCC should be compelling authority in Louisiana.
Acceptance of court decisions of a state from which the legislature has
"borrowed" a statute is the accepted rule in Louisiana. See, e.g., State v.
Macalusa, 235 La. 1019, 106 So. 2d 455 (1958); Standard Oil Co. v. Collector of
Revenue, 210 La. 428, 27 So. 2d 268 (1946); Broussard v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 188 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 249 La. 713, 190
So. 2d 233 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 909 (1967).
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bank to pay out of its customer's account according to his
order. As to the deposited money, the bank is a debtor and the
customer is a creditor.5 Banks must follow their customer's
order to pay; likewise, the customer's order not to pay must
be obeyed. Most of the legal controversies between bank and
customer involve the question of whether an item6 is "prop-
erly payable." If the item is "properly payable," the bank
must pay it, ,debiting the customer's account; to fail to do so
raises the issue of wrongful dishonor. If the item is not prop-
erly payable, the bank cannot charge the item to the cus-
tomer's account in the absence of negligence or ratification on
the part of the customer.7
Section 4-401(1) states:
As against its cVstomer, a bank may charge against
his account any item which is otherwise properly payable
from that account even though the charge creates an
overdraft.
Implicit in this section is the bank's inability to charge the
customer's account on items that are not properly payable,
but that key label is not meaningfully defined in Chapter 4.8
The Official UCC Comments are not part of the enactment of the Com-
mercial Laws, but Louisiana courts should view them as reliable aids in
construing the new law. See, e.g., In re Augustin Bros. Co., 460 F.2d 376 (8th
Cir. 1972); Warren's Kiddie Shoppe, Inc. v. Casual Slacks, Inc., 120 Ga. App.
578, 171 S.E.2d 643 (1969); Burchett v. Allied Concord Fin. Corp., 74 N.M. 575,
396 P.2d 186 (1964). See also Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 808-09 (1958).
5. See, e.g., Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
345 Mass. 1, 5, 184 N.E.2d 358, 360-61 (1962). Prior Louisiana law was in
accord. See, e.g., Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 204 La.
777, 16 So. 2d 352 (1943); Allen v. Cochran, 160 La. 425, 107 So. 292 (1926); In re
Louisiana Sav. Bank & Safe Deposit Co., 40 La. Ann. 514, 4 So. 301 (1888).
0'. Defined in LA. R.S. 10:4-104(1)(g) (Supp. 1974) as "any instrument for
the payment of money even though it is not negotiable but does not include
money." Personal checks, bank checks, cashiers' checks, notes, ,and non-
negotiable instruments payable at a bank are all "items."
7. LA. R.S. 10:3-404, 3-406-07, 4-406 (Supp. 1974).
8. Definitional sections are found in Louisiana Revised Statutes, Title 10,
Chapter 1 which apply generally throughout the act; these sections are
subject to or qualified by definitional sections found in Chapter 3 and in
Chapter 4 which apply only to the chapter in which they are found. See LA.
R.S. 10:1-201, 3-102, 4-104-05 (Supp. 1974). An item coming within the scope of
both Chapters 3 and 4 is subject to the provisions of both chapters, but
Chapter 4 controls in the event of a conflict. LA. R.S. 10:3-103(2), 4-102(1)
(Supp. 1974).
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Apparently the intent of the legislature and of the drafters of
the UCC was to leave undisturbed the existing case law on
the issue. Thus, absent the customer's negligence or ratifica-
tion, courts generally hold that checks bearing an unau-
thorized or forged signature of the customer, or no signature
at all,9 are not properly payable.10 Similarly, checks bearing a
forged necessary indorsement," altered items, 2 prematurely
presented post-dated checks, 13 stale checks,'1 4 conditional
checks, 15 and checks subjected to valid and timely stop pay-
ment orders 16 are not properly payable.
The Commercial Laws provide properly payable status to
some items which heretofore were either not properly pay-
able or only arguably within the properly payable category.
9. See LA. R.S. 10:3-401(1) (Supp. 1974).
10. See, e.g., Couvillon v. Whitney Nat'l Bank, 218 La. 1096, 51 So. 2d 798
(1951); Polizzotto v. People's Bank, 125 La. 770, 51 So. 843 (1910); Etting v.
Commercial Bank, 7 Rob. 459 (1844). The following cases, decided under § 4-
401 in other jurisdictions, are in accord: Sabatino v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 446
F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1971); Dispatch Serv., Inc. v. Airport Bank, 266 So. 2d 127
(Fla. App. 1972); W.P. Harlin Constr. Co. v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 23
Utah 2d 422, 464 P.2d 585 (1970).
-11. See Smith v. Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 255 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1971), rev'd in part, affd in part, 272 So. 2d 678 (1973). Cf. LA. R.S.
10:3-504(1), 3-110, 3-202 (Supp. 1974); Columbia Peanut Co. v. Frosteg, 472 F.2d
476 (5th Cir. 1973).
12. Under LA. R.S. 10:4-401(2)(a) (Supp. 1974), and consonant with the
rights of a holder in due course against the drawer, altered items are prop-
erly payable to the extent of the original tenor; the raised amount would not
be properly payable. Cf. LA. R.S. 10:3-407(3) (Supp. 1974).
13. While the stated conclusion is inferable from LA. R.S. 10:3-114(2)
(Supp. 1974), the practical effect of labeling post-dated checks presented prior
to date as not properly payable is diminished considerably by LA. R.S. 10:4-
407 (Supp. 1974), under which a payor bank may refuse to recredit the cus-
tomer's account by subrogating itself to the rights of the party presenting
the item. Cf. Montano v. Springfield Gardens Nat'l Bank, 207 Misc. 840, 140
N.Y.S.2d 63 (1955); Roland v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 463 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1971).
14. Under LA. R.S. 10:4-404 (Supp. 1974), a check becomes stale six
months after its date, and a payor bank may at its option treat it as not
properly payable and dishonor it, or in good faith treat it as properly payable
and honor it.
15. Fulfillment of the condition makes such items properly payable.
16. See Wilmington Trust Co. v. Delaware Auto Sales, 271 A.2d 41 (Del.
1970). Subrogation under LA. R.S. 10:4-407 (Supp. 1974) limits the practical
effect of labeling "stopped" items "not properly payable." See Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 161 F. Supp. 790 (D. Mass.
1958); Cicci v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 46 Misc. 2d 465, 260 N.Y.S.2d
100 (1965).
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Under § 4-401(1), for instance, an overdraft item is clearly
properly payable. 17 Items issued by incompetent or sub-
sequently deceased customers are properly payable under
§ 4-405 until the bank knows of interdiction'8 or death and has
reasonable opportunity to act on that knowledge.' 9 In the
case of checks, a bank with knowledge of its customer's death
may for ten days after the date of death pay or certify checks
drawn on or prior to the date of death, 20 unless ordered to
stop payment by a person claiming an interest in the ac-
count.
21
Checks emanating from payroll padding schemes, or
which otherwise bear an unauthorized indorsement of a
"fictitious" payee, are properly payable whenever the provi-
sions of § 3-405(1)(b) and (c) apply, in that such indorsements
are thereby rendered effective. 22 As under § 9(3) of the N.I.L.,
17. Official UCC Comment 1 to § 4-401 recognizes that such an item
"itself authorizes the payment for the drawer's account and carries an im-
plied promise to reimburse the drawee." UCC decisions equate the overdraft
payment with a loan to the customer as to which the customer is liable for
interest at the applicable lawful rate. See State v. Creachbaum, 24 Ohio App.
2d 31, 263 N.E.2d 675 (1970); City Bank v. Tenn, 52 Hawaii 51, 469 P.2d 816
(1970). Prior Louisiana case law is in accord. See Caddo Trust & Sav. Bank v.
Bush, 182 So. 397 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
18. Under this section an adjudication of interdiction is not constructive
notice to the payor bank. See Official UCC Comment 2 to § 4-405. Thus, the
burden of administering the affairs of the incompetent drawer are placed on
his family or perhaps on his business associates, and on the court system,
rather than on the banking system. LA. R.S. 10:1-201 (Supp. 1974) contains
several definitions of importance regarding "notice" and "knowledge" in the
case of an "organization."
19. Little definitional guidance is provided in the Commercial Laws re-
garding this fact issue. Cf. Joseph v. United of America Bank, 131 Ill. App. 2d
434, 266 N.E.2d 438 (1970).
20. UCC § 4-405, Comment 3 points out that the purpose of the ten-day
period is to permit holders of checks drawn and issued shortly before the
customer's death to cash them without the necessity of filing a claim in
probate. The purpose is said to be justified by the fact that checks are
normally given in immediate payment of an obligation and rarely is there a
reason to dishonor them. The representative of the deceased may, of course,
recover from the party paid if the deceased could have done so.
21. UCC § 4-405, Comment 4 says that such a notice has the same effect
as a stop payment order, but the bank has no responsibility to determine the
validity of the claim. The probable response of most banks would be to stop
payment at the order of anyone, no matter how tenuous his interest in the
account might appear.
22. LA. R.S. 10:3-405(1) (Supp. 1974) (in part): "An indorsement by any
person in the name of a iamed payee is effective if ... (b) a person signing as
or on behalf of a maker or drawer intends the payee to have no interest in
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the drawee-payor bank may treat such items as properly
payable out of the customer-drawer's account. The implicit
policy determination is that the drawer-employer is in a bet-
ter position vis-a-vis the drawee-payor bank to prevent such
unauthorized endorsements by utilizing prudent hiring prac-
tices and internal controls on the drawing and handling of
checks. The drawer in such circumstances is also in a better
position to protect against and absorb the inevitable loss
through insurance and cost-price pass-through.
23
Section 3-405(1)(a) 24 gives properly payable status to
checks bearing the unauthorized indorsement of an "im-
poster." Imposter cases were not within the coverage of
N.I.L. § 9(3), but developed in the courts, which usually fol-
lowed the dominant intent theory.25 Section 3-405(1)(a) cod-
ifies the properly payable nature of imposter-indorsed checks,
but rejects the intent approach. 26 Section 3-405 can be viewed
as a specialized application of the broader principle of preclu-
sion embodied in other provisions of the Commercial Laws,
under which items bearing forgeries of the customer's name
or of indorsements, and altered items may be properly pay-
able if the customer is precluded by his own negligence from
asserting the forgery or alteration against the payor bank.
2 7
A stop payment order not received "at such time and in
such manner as to afford the bank a reasonable opportunity
to act on it" 2 8 has no effect on an item that is otherwise
properly payable. In like manner, items deposited without the
the instrument; or (c) an agent or employee of the maker has supplied him
with the name of the payee intending the latter to have no such interest."
23. UCC § 3-405, Comment 4. See, e.g., Leary, Some Aspects of Article 3 of
the U.C.C., 48 KY. LJ. 198, 222-24 (1960) (imposter and fictitious payees)
[hereinafter cited as Leary]; Sutherland, Article 3-Logic, Experience &
Negotiable Paper, 1952 WIs. L. REV. 230, 241-45; Note, 31 BoS. U.L. REV. 224
(1951).
24. LA. R.S. 10:3-405(1) (Supp. 1974) (in part): "An indorsement by any
person in the name of a named payee is effective if: (a) an imposter by use of
the mails or otherwise has induced the maker or drawer to issue the instru-
ment to him or his confederate in the name of the payee. .. "
25. See Leary at 222; Comment, The Effect of the Adoption of the Pro-
posed U.C.C. on the Negotiable Instruments Law of Louisiana-The Imposter
Rule, 16 LA. L. REV. 115 (1955).
26. UCC § 3-405, Comment 2.
27. See LA. R.S. 10:3-404(1), 3-406, 3-407(2)(a) (Supp. 1974). A customer
may also ratify his unauthorized signature or assent to an alteration. See
LA. R.S. 10:3-404(2), 3-407(2)(a) (Supp. 1974).
28. LA. R.S. 10:4-403(1) (Supp. 1974).
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necessary indorsement of the payee or other holder become
properly payable whenever the depositary bank utilizes the
right granted it by § 4-205 to supply the missing indorse-
ment.29 Non-negotiable instruments may also be properly
payable items, 30 as may instruments made payable to a person
under a wrong or misspelled name.31 Finally, § 4-401(2)(b)
permits a bank in good faith to charge the customer's account
according to the tenor of his completed item, unless the bank
has notice that the completion was improper. 32
Order in Which Items May Be Charged
Customers' items are normally honored in the order of
presentment. But suppose three checks in the amounts of $5,
$100, and $500, all drawn by one customer, are presented
simultaneously to the payor bank for payment at a time when
the customer's balance is $575-insufficient to cover all three
checks. Assuming all three items are otherwise properly pay-
able, the payor bank may, under § 4-401(1), charge all three
against the customer's account and create an overdraft of
$30. But § 4-401(1) is merely permissive, and since "properly
payable" includes availability of funds for payment, 33 the
bank can, absent an agreement with the customer to the
contrary, refuse to create the overdraft on the basis that one
of the three items is not properly payable. The problem, of
course, is which one of the items may be dishonored. Clearly,
all three items cannot be dishonored.3 4 Some bankers may
feel in such circumstances that checks should be honored
according to amount, honoring as many small checks as pos-
sible and dishonoring the remaining checks, 35 while others
may reasonably feel that the largest checks should be hon-
29. The right is limited to a depositary bank supplying the missing
necessary indorsement of its customer.
30. Cf. Irving Trust Co. v. Leff, 253 N.Y. 359, 171 N.E. 569 (1930). If the
reason for non-negotiability is the conditional nature of the item, it may not
be properly payable. See note 15, supra.
31. LA. R.S. 10:3-203 (Supp. 1974). Such a payee may indorse the instru-
ment with his true indorsement, or may indorse in the wrong or misspelled
name; but he may be required to sign in both names.
32. The subsection is consonant with §§ 3-115, 3-407(3). "Notice" is
defined in LA. R.S. 10:1-201 (Supp. 1974).
33. LA. R.S. 10:4-104(1)(i) (Supp. 1974).
34. See Reinisch v. Consolidated Nat'l Bank, 45 Pa. Super. 236 (1911).
35. The theory here would be that the dishonor of a small check carries
the greatest potential for adverse reflection on credit worthiness of the
customer.
[Vol. 36
1975] BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP
ored first, leaving only smaller items to be dishonored.36 Still
other bankers may adopt some other approach. Section
4-303(2) solves the dilemma by permitting the payment or
charging of items "in any order convenient to the bank. '37
Banks, however, remain under the general obligations of
good faith3 and ordinary care3 9 regarding the application of
the convenient order of charge.
Wrongful Dishonor
The Commercial Laws omitted the last three sentences of
UCC § 4-402 in order to preserve the Louisiana jurisprudence
regarding wrongful dishonor.40 Under the jurisprudence,
wrongful dishonor of the check of a non-merchant gives rise
to an action for actual damages proved, 41 or at least nominal
damages, 42 while wrongful dishonor of a merchant's check
may result in an award of damages without proof of actual
loss. 43 Injury to credit standing44 and reputation, 45 humilia-
tion, and annoyance 46 provide the basis for the action. Courts
36. Bankers who take this view may feel that the holder of a large check
is more likely to take legal action against the drawer upon dishonor.
37. UCC § 4-303, Comment 6 notes that the rule is justified because of the
impossibility of stating a rule that would be fair in all cases. The Comment
further observes that "where the drawer has drawn all the checks, he should
have funds available to meet all of them and has no basis for urging [that]
one should he paid before another ... "
38. LA. R.S. 10:1-203 (Supp. 1974).
39. LA. R.S. 10:4-103(1), (5) (Supp. 1974).
40. LA. R.S. 10:4-402 (Supp. 1974), Comment by Louisiana State Law
Institute [hereinafter cited as LSLI Comment]. Wrongful dishonor under
UCC § 4-402 does not differ radically from § 4-402 of the Commercial Laws
and its accompanying case law. Cf. Trumbull, Bank Deposits and Collections in
Illinois under the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 55 N.W.U.L. REV. 253,
280 (1960).
41. Spearing v. Whitney-Central Nat'l Bank, 129 La. 607, 56 So. 548
(1911).
42. Ott v. Kentwood Bank, 152 La. 962, 94 So. 899 (1922) ($1.00 damages).
43. Levin v. Commercial Germania Trust & Sav. Bank, 133 La. 492, 63 So.
601 (1913) ($5.50 check; judgment for $30 damages affirmed). But see Ott v.
Kentwood Bank, 152 La. 962, 94 So. 899 (1922). The presumption of damage to
a merchant was eliminated in the portion of UCC § 4-402 not adopted in
Louisiana.
44.. Levin v. Commercial Germania Trust & Sav. Bank, 133 La. 492, 63 So.
601 (1913).
45. Spearing v. Whitney-Central Nat'l Bank, 129 La. 607, 56 So. 548
(1911).
46. Galloway v. Vivian State Bank, 168 La. 691, 123 So. 126 (1929) ($1,500
judgment reduced to $500).
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have recognized such mitigating circumstances as prior ques-
tionable credit standing,4 prompt action by the bank in
notifying the customer's creditors of the mistake,48 and the
type of error involved. 49 While an action under § 4-402 could
be viewed as premised upon breach of the bank-customer
agreement,50 Louisiana courts hold the action to be within
article 2315 of the Civil Code. 5 1 Accordingly, damages for
arrest or prosecution occasioned by wrongful dishonor should
be recoverable. 52
Customer's Duties
Under § 4-406(1) the customer has an affirmative duty to
exercise reasonable care and promptness to examine the
statement of account and paid items sent to him or otherwise
reasonably made available to him by the payor bank5 3 and to
discover forgeries 54 of his signature or any alteration 55 on an
47. Id. See also Ott v. Kentwood Bank, 152 La. 962, 94 So. 899 (1922). In
Spearing v. Whitney-Central Nat'l Bank, 129 La. 607, 56 So. 548 (1911), the
bank argued that the customer's prior credit reputation was so good it
couldn't possibly have been tarnished by the wrongful dishonor.
48. Levin v. Commercial Germania Trust & Sav. Bank, 133 La. 492, 63 So.
601 (1913); Spearing v. Whitney-Central Nat'l Bank, 129 La. 607, 56 So. 548
(1911).
49. Id.
50. Cf. Weaver v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 30 Cal. Rptr.
4, 380 P.2d 644 (1963).
51. Cf. Spearing v. Whitney-Central Nat'l Bank, 129 La. 607, 56 So. 548
(1911).
52. Cf. Weaver v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 30 Cal. Rptr.
4, 380 P.2d 644 (1963).
53. The issue of "made available" under § 4-406 is discussed against an
interesting factual backdrop in Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 55 Tenn. App.
545, 403 S.W.2d 109 (1966). See also Sabatino v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 446 F.2d
1046 (5th Cir. 1971); Faber v. Edgewater Nat'l Bank, 101 N.J. Super. 354, 244
A.2d 339 (1968) (cancelled items made available to depositor's dishonest
agent); Rainbow Inn, Inc. v. Clayton Nat'l Bank, 86 N.J. Super. 13, 205 A.2d
753 (1965) (same). The customer has no duty under the Commercial Laws
with respect to items charged to his account which do not purport to be
drawn against the account. See Faber v. Edgewater Nat'l Bank, 101 N.J.
Super. 354, 244 A.2d 339 (1968).
54. Under LA. R.S. 10:3-404 (Supp. 1974) there is no meaningful distinc-
tion between an unauthorized signature and a forged signature; either is
"wholly inoperative as that of the person whose name is signed unless he
ratifies it or is precluded from denying it." Id.
55. Cf. Israel v. State Nat'l Bank, 6 Orleans App. 325 (La. App. 1909).
While the phrase "any alteration" is probably broader than "material altera-
tion" as defined in § 3-407(1), in the § 4-406 context alterations falling short of
[Vol. 36
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item. If his examination discloses any forgeries or alterations,
the customer must promptly notify the bank. Failure to com-
ply with these duties may preclude the customer from assert-
ing the forgery or alteration against the bank, but only if the
bank has both suffered a loss by reason of the failure56 and
exercised ordinary care in paying the item. 57 The customer
must in any event discover and report his unauthorized sig-
nature or any alteration on the face or back of the item
within one year from the time the statement and items are
made available to him, or be precluded thereafter from as-
serting them against the bank.58 In addition, though he has
material alterations under § 3-407(1) are probably inconsequential, in that an
alteration which does not "change the contract of any party to the instru-
ment" would not make the item "not properly payable" under § 4-401(1).
56. LA. R.S. 10:4-406(2)(a) (Supp. 1974). Compare Jackson v. First Nat'l
Bank, 55 Tenn. App. 545, 403 S.W.2d 109 (1966), with Terry v. Puget Sound
Nat'l Bank, 80 Wash. 2d 157, 492 P.2d 534 (1972). Cf. Israel v. State Nat'l
Bank, 6 Orleans App. 325 (La. App. 1909). The failure of the customer with
respect to the duty imposed is a question of fact as to which the burden is
upon the bank to establish. See UCC § 4-406, Comment 4. Prior Louisiana law
under La. Acts 1904, No. 64, § 36 was very similar, although the duty imposed
under § 36 concerned the discovery and reporting of "any errors" in the
account. However, unlike forgeries of the customer's signature and altera-
tions of the amount payable ("raised" items), a forged indorsement would not
result in an "error" in the account, so that the duty would appear to be quite
similar to that under LA. R.S. 10:4-406 (Supp. 1974). The decision in Smith v.
Richland State Bank, 9 So. 2d 327 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942), placing the burden
on the party asserting the "error" under La. Acts 1904, No. 64, § 36 would not
be rendered inconsistent under § 4-406.
The customer may also be precluded from asserting the forgery as an
alteration under LA. R.S. 10:3-404, 3-406, and 3-407(2)(a) (Supp. 1974).
57. LA. R.S. 10:4-406(2)(a), (3) (Supp. 1974). See, e.g., Hardex-Steubenville
Corp. v. Western Pa. Nat'l Bank, 446 Pa. 446, 285 A.2d 874 (1971); Exchange
Bank & Trust Co. v. Kidwell Constr. Co., 463 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971);
W.P. Harlin Constr. Co. v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 23 Utah 2d 422, 464
P.2d 585 (1970). The customer must establish the lack of ordinary care on the
part of the bank in paying the item under LA. R.S. 10:4-406(3) (Supp. 1974). If
both customer and bank are negligent with respect to the item, the customer
is not precluded from asserting the forgery or alteration under LA. R.S.
10:4-406(3) (Supp. 1974). See Faber v. Edgewater Nat'l Bank, 101 N.J. Super.
354, 244 A.2d 339 (1968); First Nat'l Bank v. Mann, 410 P.2d 74 (Okla. 1965).
The customer may also be precluded from asserting forgeries or altera-
tions by the same wrongdoer after the initial item and statement is available
for a reasonable period not exceeding fourteen calendar days, and before
notification by the customer of the initial forgery or alteration. LA. R.S.
10:4-406(2)(b) (Supp. 1974).
58. LA. R.S. 10:4-406(4) (Supp. 1974). Cf. La. Acts 1904, No. 64, §§ 35, 53;
Hardex-Steubenville Corp. v. Western Pa. Nat'l Bank, 446 Pa. 446, 285 A.2d
874 (1971).
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no affirmative duty under § 4-406 to discover or promptly
report unauthorized indorsements, 59 a customer is precluded
from asserting against the bank any unauthorized indorse-
ments not reported to the bank within three years from the
time the statement and items are made available to him. 60
Indorsements made in imposter or fictitious payee cir-
cumstances set forth in § 3-405 are not unauthorized in-
dorsements. Such items are properly payable and any notice
to 'the bank by the customer of the alleged unauthorized
nature of the indorsements under § 4-406(4) would be ineffec-
tive.6 1 The bank could treat a notice given prior to payment
as a countermand of the customer's order to pay and could
dishonor the item without incurring liability to any party to
the instrument.6 2 Finally, if a payor bank has a valid preclusion
defense under § 4-406 to raise against the customer's claim
that the account should be recredited, a waiver of the defense
or a failure to assert it upon request precludes the bank from
thereafter asserting the unauthorized signature or alteration
against any collecting bank or other prior party presenting or
transferring the item.6 3 The preclusion apparently does not
operate against the bank waiving or failing to assert a de-
fense based on other sections of the Commercial Laws.6
Customer's Right to Stop Payment
As a natural corollary of the rule that a bank must obey
the order of its customer to pay, a customer may, by order to
59. Prior Louisiana statutes and case law are in accord. See La. Acts
1904, No. 64, § 36; Wm. M. Barret, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 191 La. 945, 186 So.
741 (1939).
60. LA. R.S. 10:4-406(4) (Supp. 1974). For justification of the time period,
see UCC § 4-406, Comment 5.
61. See UCC § 406, Comment 6.
62. The payor bank's duty to pay is owed only to its customer, unless the
bank certifies the item. LA. R.S. 10:3-411 (Supp. 1974). Accordingly, the dis-
honor would create no liability on the part of the bank.
63. LA. R.S. 10:4-406(5) (Supp. 1974). See Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce v. Federal Reserve Bank, 64 Misc. 2d 959, 316 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1970).
The language "may not assert . . . the unauthorized signature" arguably
includes unauthorized indorsement as well as the unauthorized signature of
the customer.
64. Similar defenses would arise under § 3-404, 3-406 and 3-407. UCC
§ 4-406, Comment 7 concedes that the preclusion principle of subsection 5
"might well be applied" to other types of customer claims and defenses to
such claims, but states that the rule of subsection 5 is limited to defenses of a
payor bank under § 4-406 and that "no present need is known to give the rule
wider effect."
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the bank, stop payment on "any item payable for his ac-
count."6 5 The right under § 4-403 is given only to a customer ,66
and the stop payment order has no effect beyond the bank-
customer relationship, 67 but a stop payment order which is
proper and timely under § 4-403 is effective against the payor
bank, or other drawee, regardless of the status of the holder
or payor bank as a holder in due course. 68 While § 4-403 is less
than clear on the point, it would seem that both parties to a
joint checking account would be "customers,"6 9 and either
could, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, issue a
valid stop payment order with respect to an item drawn by
the other and payable from the joint account.7 0
65. LA. R.S. 10:4-403 (Supp. 1974). Since a check is no more than an order
or direction of the drawer to the drawee revocable at the will of the drawer, a
countermand of such an order or direction has equal standing and must, at
the peril of the drawee-payor bank, be obeyed. See Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 161 F. Supp. 790 (D. Mass. 1958). Official
UCC § 4-403, Comment 2 expresses the view that stopping payment "is a
service which depositors expect and are entitled to receive from banks not-
withstanding its difficulty, inconvenience and expense."
66. See LA. R.S. 10:4-104(1)(e) (Supp. 1974), at note 3, supra. Under LA.
R.S. 10:4-405(2) (Supp. 1974) a non-customer may in the limited circumstances
order payment stopped, though liability for a wrongful payment over such an
order is not clear.
67. The holder of an item on which payment is stopped is owed no duty at
all by the payor bank which has not certified the item or paid it. LA. R.S.
10:3-411(1), 3-413(1), 4-213(1) (Supp. 1974). But while he is not entitled to
payment on the instrument, the holder has recourse against the drawer and
any prior recourse indorsers under LA. R.S. 10:3-413-14 (Supp. 1974). Cf.
Mason v. Blayton, 119 Ga. App. 203, 166 S.E.2d 601 (1969).
68. As to a payor bank's status as a holder in due course, see Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 161 F. Supp. 790 (D.C.
Mass. 1958); Nida v. Michael, 34 Mich. App. 290, 191 N.W.2d 151 (1971). While
of no consequence with regard to the efficacy of the customer's stop payment
order, the holder's status as a holder in due course has obvious practical
value to the payor bank under LA. R.S. 4-407 (Supp. 1974). Cf. Gulf Refining
Co. v. Bagby, 200 La. 258, 7 So. 2d 903 (1942).
69. See LA. R.S. 10:1-102(5), 4-104(1)(e) (Supp. 1974).
70. Professor Hawkland adopts this view, but points out that a pre-UCC
decision held to the contrary. See Hawkland, Stop Payment Orders Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 3 U.C.C. L.J. 103, 106-07 (1970). Under the provi-
sions of LA. R.S. 6:32(B, C) (1950) (not repealed by the Commercial Laws),
payment out of a joint deposit under the names of two or more persons,
payable to each, may be stopped by one of the joint depositors but only by
a written notice to the bank. Thereafter, the bank may refuse to honor any
check or demand on the account by any of the joint depositors (including the
one requesting the stopping of payment), unless all the joint depositors join
in drawing a check or demand or other withdrawal. Presumably, all joint
depositors may in concert stop payment by oral notification, and certainly if
1975]
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Section 4-403 does not prescribe any particular form for a
stop payment order, but subsection (1) implies that the cus-
tomer should be prepared to reasonably identify the item, as by
providing his account number and either the check number or
the payee71 and date, and possibly the face amount of the
check. 72 Any statement of the customer's reasons for ordering
payment stopped is irrelevant under § 4-403. 73
A written stop order is effective for six months and can be
renewed in writing.74 Oral stop orders are binding for only
fourteen calendar days, but can be confirmed in writing
within the fourteen day period,75 and if so confirmed would
presumably be effective for the six month period. While oral
stop payment orders are effective, the use of an oral order not
only entails obvious problems of proof,76 but also involves the
issue of whether the stop payment order is received by the
bank "at such time and in such manner as to afford the bank
a reasonable opportunity to act on it.''77
Payment cannot be effectively stopped on a bank check, a
all such depositors give a written stop payment order, the bank may not
thereafter refuse to honor any check or demand upon the account.
71. In Levine v. Bank of United States, 132 Misc. 130, 229 N.Y.S. 108
(Mun. Ct. 1928), the stop payment order recited that the payee's name was
"Harold Orkland," but the check was in fact payable to "H. Orkland." The
stop order was held reasonably descriptive and valid.
72. See, e.g., Kentucky-Farmers Bank v. Staton, 314 Ky. 313,'235 S.W.2d
767 (1951); Shude v. American State Bank, 263 Mich. 519, 248 N.W. 886 (1933);
John H. Mahon Co. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 62 Ohio App. 261, 23 N.E.2d 638
(1939).
73. Cf. Cicci v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 46 Misc. 2d 465, 260
N.Y.S.2d 100 (1965) (defense that the check had been issued to pay an unlaw-
ful gambling transaction raised without success by a bank which had paid
the check over a valid and timely stop payment order).
74. LA. R.S. 10:4-403(2) (Supp. 1974).
75. Id. UCC § 4-403, Comment 6 observes that stop orders are normally
given first by telephone. Validation of oral stop payment orders codifies
decisions such as Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 P. 947
(1926). Several states have, however, adopted a version of UCC § 4-403 which
requires written stop orders. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 4.403(b)
(1968).
76. Under LA. R.S. 10:4-403(3), the customer has the burden of establish-
ing "the fact ... [of] payment ... contrary to a binding stop payment order
.."1 as well as the amount of loss resulting therefrom. The inference is com-
pelling that subsection (3) was a trade-off for valid oral stop payment orders
in the process of drafting the UCC's official text. For problems of proof, see
Hawkland, Stop Payment Orders Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 3
U.C.C. L.J. 103 (1970).
77. LA. R.S. 10:4-403(1) (Supp. 1974).
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certified check, or a cashier's (or "teller's") check. Because
a bank drawing a check on its account in another bank is a
"customer," 78 payment of a bank check technically can be
stopped by the drawer-bank, but since its engagement as a
drawer under § 3-413 would thereby be triggered, the bank
would be liable to the holder. Furthermore, in the unlikely
event that the bank itself has a personal defense to raise, the
defense could be cut off by a holder in due course of the bank
check. 79 The drawer bank's "customer" cannot compel the
bank check to be stopped since the item is not "an item
payable for his account" but rather is an obligation of the
drawer-bank.
The drawer-customer cannot stop payment of a certified
check by virtue of § 4-303(1)(a), regardless of whether cer-
tification was procured by the drawer-customer or by the
holder. Neither can the certifying bank stop payment, be-
cause it is not a customer within the meaning of § 4-403(1),
and because it has, by certification, become primarily liable
on the instrument.8 0
A cashier's check is a draft drawn by a bank on itself."'
Neither the bank nor the customer can stop payment since
the bank is not its own "customer" and the check is not "an
item payable for [the customer's] account" under § 4-403.
Furthermore, courts may view cashiers' checks as accepted in
advance upon issuance, 82 and therefore not subject to a stop
order by virtue of § 4-303(1)(a).
78. LA. R.S. 10:4-104(1)(e) (Supp. 1974). But see Meckler v. Highland Falls
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 64 Misc. 2d 407, 314 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
79. LA. R.S. 10:3-305 (Supp. 1974). Additionally, LA. R.S. 10:4-407 (Supp.
1974) does not seem applicable to such a situation, and it is doubtful that a
bank-drawer could raise the defenses of its customer. But see Wilmington
Trust Co. v. Delaware Auto Sales, 271 A.2d 41 (Del. 1970) (bank successfully
refused to honor a treasurer's check as to which there was a failure of
consideration).
80. LA. R.S. 10:3-411, 3-413(1) (Supp. 1974).
81. See Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 427 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1970);
National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327
(1970); Malphrus v. Home Sav. Bank, 44 Misc. 2d 705, 254 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1965).
82. See, e.g.,'National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super.
347, 268 A.2d 327 (1970). It has been held that a "register check-personal
money order" may be stopped by the "customer" who purchased it. Garden
Check Cashing Serv. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 25 App. Div. 2d 137, 267
N.Y.S.2d 698, aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 941, 277 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1966). The right to
countermand a "traveler's check" is discussed in Hawkland, American
Traveler's Checks, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 501, 523 (1966).
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Payments Over Valid Stop Orders: Subrogation and Proof
of Damages
Payment in violation of a valid and timely stop payment
order is improper, even though made by mistake or inadver-
tence, unless the customer ratifies the action.8 3 The burden of
establishing the loss from the improper payment is on the
customer under § 4-403(3).84 But frequently a customer with
personal defenses to assert has suffered no loss from the
wrongful payment because the item was held by a holder in
due course or his transferee8 5 to whom the customer would
have been liable under §§ 3-413 and 3-305 had the check been
dishonored.8 Some early cases reflected the feeling that
banks should not be required to recredit the customer's ac-
count in such circumstances by ruling that payment cannot
be stopped against a holder in due course. 7 Though techni-
cally incorrect,8 8 such decisions do state a shorthand refer-
ence to the principle of subrogation, under which payment
may not be effectively stopped as against an item in the
hands of one who is, or has the rights of, a holder in due
course. Section 4-407 adopts that principle:
If a payor bank has paid an item over the [valid] stop
payment order of the drawer .... to prevent unjust en-
richment and only to the extent necessary to prevent loss
to the bank by reason of its payment of the item, the
payor bank shall be subrogated to the rights (a) of any
holder in due course on the item ... ; (b) and of the payee
or any other holder of the item against the drawer .... 89
83. UCC § 4-403, Comment 8.
84. LA. R.S. 10:4-403(3) (Supp. 1974).
85. See LA. R.S. 10:3-201(1) (Supp. 1974).
86. See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 161
F. Supp. 790 (D. Mass. 1958).
87. See Gulf Refining Co. v. Bagby, 200 La. 258, 275, 7 So. 2d 903, 909
(1942).
88. The doctrine that payment cannot be stopped against a holder in due
course would only be true if a check were treated as an assignment of the
drawer's funds. Cf. LA. R.S. 10:3-409(1) (Supp. 1974); Hiroshima v. Bank of
Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 371, 248 P. 947, 951 (1926).
89. LA. R.S. 10:4-407(a), (b) (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added). The theory
underlying this section is that the bank has paid out its own money by virtue
of its inability to charge the customer's account under § 4-401. See Clarke v.
Camden Trust Co., 84 N.J. Super. 304, 201 A.2d 762 (1964), affd, 89 N.J. Super.
459, 215 A.2d 381 (1965). Cf. Hart v. Polizzotto, 171 La. 493, 131 So. 574 (1930).
The preventing of unjust enrichment is a proper but not an indispensible
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Viewing §§ 4-403(3) and 4-407(a) together, it is difficult to
see the need for both subsections since the litigated result is
likely to be the same under either.90 Subsections (b) and (c) of
§ 4-407, however, extend the subrogation rule to permit banks
to assert against the drawer the rights of the payee or any
other holder either on the item or on the underlying transac-
tion9l and to assert the drawer's rights against the payee or
other holder with respect to the transaction out of which the
item arose.9 2
Section 4-407, though directed primarily toward pay-
ments over valid stop orders, extends the right of subrogation
to circumstances which otherwise give the customer a basis
for objection to payment. Subrogation, then, apparently can
be invoked by a bank whenever the customer alleges that his
item was not properly payable. Of course, if the bank refuses
to recredit the customer's account it has suffered no loss and
§ 4-407 would not be triggered. Finally, UCC Comment 5 makes
it clear that § 4-407 does not limit other rights or defenses
assertable against the customer by the payor bank, including
ratification of the wrongful payment.
VARYING THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMMERCIAL LAWS
Provisions and Limitations
The Commercial Laws contain both a general and a lim-
ited provision empowering the parties to vary the effect of
provisions of the new law. 93 Sections 1-102(3) 94 and 4-103(1)95
element under § 4-407. See South Shore Nat'l Bank v. Donner, 104 N.J. Super.
169, 249 A.2d 25 (1969) (bank's action successful, though defendant not un-
justly enriched).
90. Compare Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co.,
161 F. Supp. 790 (D. Mass. 1958) with Cicci v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
46 Misc. 2d 465, 260 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1965).
91. See UCC § 4-407, Comments 2-4.
92. See R.G. McClung Cotton Co. v. Cotton Concentration Co., 479 S.W.2d
733 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). If the bank recredits the drawer's account, for
example, it may be subrogated to the rights of the drawer to bring a fraud
action against the payee, but double recovery by the bank is not within the
scope of § 4-407 (see Official UCC Comment 4), and the bank must prove that
the drawer-customer would have been entitled to recover against the payee
had the check been paid, or that had it not been paid, that the drawer would
have had a valid defense to the payee's claim. See First Nat'l Bank v.
Heatherly, 8 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 291 N.E.2d 280 (1972).
93. Statutory authority to vary the effect of provisions of a statute by
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embody, within limits, the principle of freedom of contract,
and predictably attempts will be made pursuant to these sec-
tions to vary the effect of the bank-customer provisions of
§§ 4-401 to 4-407. Bankers will no doubt want to exorcise the
recurrent problems incident to conditional checks, post-dated
checks, and stop payment orders, to name only a few.9 6
Whether, and the degree to which, that is possible under the
Commercial Laws is the focus of the remainder of this article.
Due to the similarity between §§ 1-102(3) and 4-103(1),97 atten-
tion will be directed in the main to § 4-103(1).
Sectionls 1-102(3) and 4-103(1) permit variation by agree-
ment of the effect of provisions of the Commercial Laws with
the following exceptions: (a) no variation is permitted
whenever the Commercial Laws otherwise provide;9 8 (b) no
agreement can disclaim the obligations prescribed by the
Commercial Laws99 pertaining to good faith,10 0 diligence, 10 1
agreement is not novel in Louisiana. Pursuant to La. Acts 1904, No. 64, § 68,
the effect of La. Acts 1904, No. 64, §§ 67 & 68 could be varied by agreement.
94. LA. R.S. 10:1-102(3) (Supp. 1974) provides: "The effect of provisions of
this Title may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided in this
Title and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness
and care prescribed by this Title may not be disclaimed by agreement but the
parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the perfor-
mance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not man-
ifestly unreasonable."
95. LA. R.S. 10:4-103(1) (Supp. 1974) provides: "The effect of the provi-
sions of this Chapter may be varied by agreement except that no agreement
can disclaim a bank's responsibility for its own lack of good faith or failure to
exercise ordinary care or can limit the measure of damages for such lack or
failure; but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which
such responsibility is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable."
96. These and other contractual provisions are discussed in J. WHITE &
R. SUMMERS, HORNBOOK ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 552-58
(1972).
97. See notes 94, 95 supra.
98. LA. R.S. 10:1-102(3) (Supp. 1974). Given the adoption in Louisiana of
only Articles 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the UCC, the exception in question is of little
present relevance, since the only examples of an "otherwise provided" excep-
tion occur in LA. R.S. 10:4-103(1) (Supp. 1974) and impliedly in LA. R.S.
10:1-203 (Supp. 1974). The exception, however, has greater relevance to provi-
sions of the UCC not adopted in Louisiana, such as UCC §§ 2-719, 9-501(3).
UCC § 1-102, Comment 3 does point out that as a matter of drafting style, the
absence of words such as "unless otherwise agreed," occurring, for example,
in LA. R.S. 10:3-201(3) (Supp. 1974) and LA. R.S. 10:3-414(2) (Supp. 1974) has
no negative implication vis-h-vis § 1-102(3).
99. LA. R.S. 10:1-102(3) (Supp. 1974).
100. See LA. R.S. 10:1-203, 1-208, 4-108(1), 4-401(2), 4-404 (Supp. 1974).
101. See LA. R.S. 10:4-202(2), 4-301-02 (Supp. 1974).
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reasonableness 02 and care; 0 3 (c) no agreement can disclaim a
bank's responsibility for its lack of good faith'04 or failure to
exercise ordinary care; 10 5 and (d) no agreement can limit the
measure of damages for any such lack or failure. Within these
limits, the parties may determine by agreement the stan-
dards by which good faith and the exercise of ordinary care are
to be measured, so long as the standards are not manifestly
unreasonable.
While no reported decisions have dealt meaningfully with
the scope or application of the freedom of contract principle
embodied in §§ 1-102(3) and 4-103(1), examination of the Offi-
cial UCC Comments to each section sheds light upon the
intent behind them. 1°6 Comment 2 to § 1-102(3), for example,
indicates that the word "agreement" includes the effect given
by § 1-205 to prior course of dealing between the parties and
any applicable usages of trade. 07 The Commercial Laws do
not adopt the UCC definition of "agreement,"' 10 8 but § 1-205
was adopted. 0 9 Obviously an "agreement" within the mean-
ing of Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:4-103 must, under
Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:1-103, be a valid and enforce-
able agreement under Louisiana law," 0 though a course of
dealing between the parties or a usage of trade may "give
particular meaning to and supplement or qualify" the terms
of an agreement between them."' Comment 2 to § 4-103 re-
102. See LA. R.S. 10:4-202(2), 4-204, 4-403(1), 4-406(1) (Supp. 1974).
103. See LA. R.S. 10:4-103(5), 4-202(1), 4-406(3) (Supp. 1974).
104. See LA. R.S. 10:1-203, 1-208, 4-108(1), 4-401(2), 4-404 (Supp. 1974).
105. See notes 102, 103, supra.
106. See notes 1, 2, supra.
107. UCC § 1-102, Comment 2.
108. UCC § 1-103 states: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of
this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the
law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud,
misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validat-
ing or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions."
The Commercial Laws deleted this section due to its reference to "con-
cepts and terms either unknown to Louisiana or having different meaning."
LA. R.S. 10:1-103, LSLI Comment. LA. R.S. 10:1-103 (Supp. 1974) states in-
stead: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Title, the other
laws of Louisiana shall apply."
109. LA. R.S. 10:1-205 (Supp. 1974). Under subsection (3), a course of
dealing between parties and any usage of trade (as those terms are defined in
§ 1-205) "give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an
agreement."
110. See note 108, supra.
111. LA. R.S. 10:1-205 (Supp. 1974). Under LA. R.S. 10:4-103(2) (Supp.
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veals that within the intent of the drafters of the UCC, the
agreement "may be direct, as between the customer and the
depositary bank,"' 1 2 or "indirect, as where the customer au-
thorizes a particular type of procedure and any bank in the
collection chain acts pursuant to such authorization"; 113 it
"may be with respect to a single item, 1 1 4 or "to all items
handled for a particular customer,"'115 as for example, a "gen-
eral agreement between the depositary bank and the cus-
tomer at the time a deposit account is opened." 116 Legends on
deposit tickets, collection letters and acknowledgments of
items, "coupled with action by the affected party constituting
acceptance, adoption, ratification, estoppel or the like, are
agreements if they meet the tests of the definition of 'agree-
ment.' "117
Taken together, the language of § 4-103(1) and its Com-
ments and § 1-102 requires an agreement, which may vary
the effect of or the legal consequences that otherwise flow
from the Commercial Laws, but neither the statute itself nor
its definitions can be varied. 1 8 Variations can disclaim, ex-
pressly or in fact, neither the obligations expressly provided
with respect to good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care,
nor the bank's obligation to exercise ordinary care,119 though
an agreement may set forth reasonable standards by which
those obligations are to be measured.
Comment 2 to UCC § 1-102 also makes it clear that while
freedom of contract is a principle of the section, the parties
cannot by agreement vary the meaning of the statute, rather,
that meaning "must be found in its text, including its defini-
tions, and in appropriate extrinsic aids.' 120 Thus, an instru-
ment cannot be made negotiable by agreement, 121 nor can the
1974), Federal Reserve regulations and operating letters and clearing house
rules have the effect of agreements under LA. R.S. 10:4-103(1) (Supp. 1974).
112. UCC § 4-103, Comment 2.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. The "tests of the definition of 'agreement' " under the Commer-
cial Laws comes through LA. R.S. 10:1-103 (Supp. 1974), rather than UCC
§ 1-102. See note 108, supra.
118. See, e.g., Citizen's Bank v. North End State Bank, 116 Kan. 303, 226
P. 998 (1924).
119. LA. R.S. 10:4-103(1), (3), (5) (Supp. 1974).
120. UCC § 1-102, Comment 2.
121. Of course, the instrument may be negotiable anyway under LA. R.S.
10:3-104 (Supp. 1974).
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meaning of such terms as "holder in due course" be changed
by agreement. 122 The general scope and philosophy of agree-
ments which vary the effects of the provisions of the
Commercial Laws are found in the UCC Comments to § 4-103:
[I]t would be unwise to freeze present methods of
operation by mandatory statutory rules. This section,
therefore, permits within wide limits variation of provi-
sions of the [Chapter] by agreement.
Subsection (1) confers blanket power to vary all pro-
visions of the [Chapter] by agreements of the ordinary
kind. The agreements may not disclaim a bank's respon-
sibility for its own lack of good faith or failure to exercise
ordinary care and may not limit the measure of damages
for such lack or failure, but this subsection like Section
1-102(3) approves the practice of parties determining by
agreement the standards by which such responsibility is
to be measured. In the absence of a showing that the
standards manifestly are unreasonable, the agreement
controls .... 123
Exculpation from Negligence
One type of agreement or clause which seems clearly
impermissible under §§ 1-102(3) and 4-103(1) is that by which a
bank seeks to exculpate itself from the legal effect of its own
failure to exercise ordinary care. The term "ordinary care" is
not defined, but Comment 4 to § 4-103 indicates that it is used
"with its normal tort meaning and not in any special sense
relating to bank collections" and that Chapter 4 makes no
attempt "to define in toto what constitutes ordinary care or
lack of it. ' ' 124 Several provisions of Chapter 4 do state certain
respects in which collecting banks 125 and payor banks 126 must
use ordinary care, and section (3) provides, as Comment 4
points out, that bank action or inaction either approved by the
Commercial Laws or taken "pursuant to Federal Reserve
regulations or operating letters, constitutes the exercise of
ordinary care."'1 27 Action or inaction in accordance with
122. UCC § 1-102, Comment 2.
123. UCC § 4-103, Comments 1, 2 (emphasis added; bracketed language
inserted to conform to Louisiana adoption).
124. UCC § 4-103, Comment 4.
125. See LA. R.S. 10:4-103(5), 4-202, 4-204, 4-210, 4-212 (Supp. 1974).
126. See LA. R.S. 10:4-401(2), 4-403(1), 4-406(1) & (3) (Supp. 1974).
127. UCC § 4-103, Comment 4.
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clearing house rules or "a general banking usage not dis-
approved" by the Commercial Laws "prima facie constitutes
the exercise of ordinary care."'128 The fact that the procedure
used is novel or innovative should not alone be sufficient to
find that the bank failed to exercise ordinary care.
Since stop payment orders create handling problems,
banks might seek to exculpate themselves from the legal ef-
fects of failure to exercise ordinary care by paying an item
over a valid stop payment order. Official UCC Comment 8 to
§ 4-403 states that "a payment in violation of an effective direc-
tion to stop payment is an improper payment, even though it
is made by mistake or inadvertence," and "any agreement to
the contrary is invalid under § 4-103(1) if in paying the item
over the stop payment order the bank has failed to exercise
ordinary care."'129 Comment 8 adopts a line of pre-UCC com-
mon law decisions holding such exculpatory clauses void as
against public policy. 130 One pre-UCC common law decision
pointed to § 4-103(1) as supportive of its holding. The de-
positor in Thomas v. First National Bank of Scranton'3'
signed a "Request to Stop Payment of Check" containing
an exculpation clause. 132 The bank made payment on the
check in question despite the stop payment "request," appar-
ently through "inadvertence, accident or oversight." In void-
ing the purported release on public policy grounds, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that payment over a valid
stop payment order, even through inadvertence, accident or
oversight, constitutes a failure to exercise due care, i.e., neg-
ligence. 133 The court also observed that depositors desiring to
128. Id.
129. See Utah Atty. Gen. Op. (1966) in W. HAWKLAND, COMMERCIAL
PAPER AND BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS 356 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as HAWKLAND]. UCC § 4-103, Comment 1.
130. See, e.g., Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 P. 947
(1926); Speroff v. First-Central Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N.E.2d 119
(1948); Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank, 376 Pa. 181, 101 A.2d 910 (1954). Contra:
Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N.E. 488 (1932); Tremont
Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N.E. 782 (1920); Gaita v. Windsor
Bank, 251 N.Y. 152, 167 N.E. 203 (1929). See also Note, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1224
(1949); Note, 34 VA; L. REV. 834 (1948); Annot., 9 A.L.R. 1067 (1920); Annot.,
1 A.L.R.2d 1150 (1948).
131. 376 Pa. 181, 101 A.2d 910 (1954).
132. The clause purported to release the bank from all liability for pay-
ment over the stop order where the payment resulted through "inadver-
tence, accident or oversight." Id. at 183, 101 A.2d at 911.
133. 376 Pa. 181, 184, 101 A.2d 910, 911 (1954). See also Montano v.
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stop payment are under no obligation in Pennsylvania to sign
an agreement of release.134 In Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton
National Bank & Trust Co.' 35 the court noted, in reference to
§ 4-103 of the 1950 Proposed UCC Draft:
Perhaps the bank and its depositor may ... be viewed
as having equal bargaining power and freedom of con-
tract, although full recognition of modern day realities
may well suggest a contrary conclusion .... Nevertheless,
the bank has been entrusted with an important franchise
to serve the public and has, from time to time, received
broad legislative protection .... Under the circumstances
might it not be appropriate to apply to banks the legal
doctrine which has deprived quasi-public enterprises such
as utilities of the power to require release clauses
comparable to that used by the defendant? 36
An exculpatory clause which escapes the public policy net'
37
may still run afoul of the rule that the bank's own contract
language will be strictly construed against it, 3 1 or the court
may find that the depositor's assent to the clause was not
obtained in fact. 39 Professors Clark and Squillante take the
view that the bank may not by agreement eliminate the cus-
tomer's right to give valid stop payment orders:
[S]uch a clause.., does not involve a disclaimer of the
bank's obligation of ordinary care. On the other hand,
4-403 gives an affirmative right to the customer, and the
availability of an oral stop order seems to be part and
Springfield Garden Nat'l Bank, 207 Misc. 840, 140 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1-955); Elder v.
Franklin Nat'l Bank, 25 Misc. 716, 55 N.Y.S. 576 (1899).
134. 376 Pa. 181, 185, 101 A.2d 910, 912 (1954). Cf. LA. R.S. 10:4-403 (Supp.
1974); Levine v. Bank of United States, 132 Misc. 130, 229 N.Y.S. 108 (1928).
The Commercial Laws impose no such obligation either. But see text at notes
110-18, supra.
135. 16 N.J. Super. 430, 84 A.2d 741 (1951).
136. Id. at 436, 84 A.2d at 744 (citations omitted, and emphasis added).
The court declined to base its decision on the public policy issue thus framed,
ruling instead that the release was unenforceable for lack of consideration.
The analogy to utility companies was also drawn by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court in Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank, 376 Pa. 181, 101 A.2d 910 (1954).
137. Cf. Cohen v. State Bank, 69 Pa. Super. 40 (1918); Levine v. Bank of
United States, 132 Misc. 130, 229 N.Y.S. 108 (1928).
138. See Montano v. Springfield Gardens Nat'l Bank, 207 Misc. 840, 140
N.Y.S.2d 63 (1955).
139. Montano v. Springfield Gardens Nat'l Bank, 207 Misc. 840, 842, 140
N.Y.S.2d 63, 63 (1955).
1975]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
parcel of that right .... For purposes of determining the
scope of allowable disclaimers under 4-103, a distinction
should be drawn between affirmative protections given to
the customer and mechanical rules governing the bank
collection system. It would seem too easy for a bank effec-
tively to contract away its liability for negligence simply
by contracting away the protection which would other-
wise give rise to that liability. For this reason, a clause
limiting the customer to written stop orders should be
deemed ineffective. 140
Clark and Squillante add that because payor banks receive
the advantage of §§ 4-403(3) and 4-407 in connection with
payments over valid stop orders, courts should look with dis-
favor upon any exculpatory clause which attempts to tip the
scale even further against the customer with regard to stop
payment orders.14 ' Clauses relied upon by a bank having
prematurely paid a post-dated check will also be subjected to
the public policy and related arguments. 42
Variations in Time Limits
While agreements that attempt to exculpate banks from
the consequences of their own lack of due care seem without
question impermissible under § 4-103(1), particularly where
fine print 14 3 or other circumstances 44 call into question the
customer's assent, other significant variations of the effect of
Chapter 4 of the Commercial Laws do seem permissible. In
140. B. CLARK & A. SQUILLANTE, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLEC-
TIONS AND CREDIT CARDS 45-46 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CLARK & SQUIL-
LANTE].
141. Id. The views of Professors White and Summers on this issue are in
accord. Id. at 552-58. Professor Hawkland has taken a contrary position on
the issue of written stop payment orders only. HAWKLAND at 114.
142. Montano v. Springfield Gardens Nat'l Bank, 207 Misc. 840, 843, 140
N.Y.S.2d 63, 66 (1955).
143. See Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 16 N.J.
Super. 430, 84 A.2d 741 (1951).
144. See, e.g., Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 17 Cal. App. 362, 248 P. 947
(1926) (customer unable to read; exculpatory clause in stop payment order
not read to him; customer erroneously informed that he was required to sign
the order); Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 16 N.J.
Super. 430, 84 A.2d 741 (1951) (follow-up letter to customer assured him that
check would not be paid); Montano v. Springfield Gardens Nat'l Bank, 207
Misc. 840, 140 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1955) (exculpatory clause in quarterly statement,
but not in passbook; no evidence that clause called to customer's attention:
clause itself non-conspicuous).
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New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Manufac-
turers Hanover Trust Co.,' 45 the depositor entered an agree-
ment with the bank that unless the depositor notified the
bank in writing of forgeries of its signature within thirty days
of the mailing of the statement of account, and of forged
indorsements within six months of the mailing of the account,
the statement would be deemed correct for all purposes and
the bank would not be liable for any payments made and
charged to the depositor's account. 146 The court upheld the
agreement, ruling that it did not absolve the bank for its
negligence or lack of good faith or ordinary care. Rather, said
the court, "it provides a condition precedent to liability in the
nature of an abbreviated period of limitations."' 47 Under the
court's rationale, agreements varying the time limits of
§ 4-406(4) within which to bring actions against the bank
seem permissible under § 4-103(1), 14a particularly in view of
the "technical complexity of the field of banking, the enor-
mous number of items handled by banks,.., the uncertainty
of changing conditions and the possibility of developing im-
proved methods of collection to speed the process .... ,u49
Section 4-103(1) should also allow agreements determining
the standard by which to judge the customer's duty to no-
tify the bank promptly of forgeries of his signature or alter-
ations of his checks. But the duty of prompt notification un-
der § 4-406(1) may be irrelevant, if the bank did not exercise
ordinary care in paying the items. 150 The New York court
read into the agreement the caveat that had the customer
shown that the bank lacked good faith or failed to exercise
ordinary care, the effect of the agreement could have been
avoided.' 5 '
The agreement in New York Credit presumably would
become important only where the customer could have dis-
145. 41 A.D.2d 912, 343 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1973).
146. The depositor's duties under § 4-406 are discussed in text accom-
panying notes 54-65, supra.
147. New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., 41 A.D.2d 912, 914, 343 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540 (1973). Cf. Valley
Nat'l Bank v. Tang, 18 Ariz. App. 40, 499 P.2d 991 (1972).
148. Accord, CLARK & SQUILLANTE at 14-15.
149. UCC § 4-103, Comment 1 (emphasis added).
150. LA. R.S. 10:4-406(3) (Supp. 1974); UCC § 4-406(3).
151. 41 A.D.2d 912, 914, 343 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540. The one-year limit is only
relevant where the bank fails to exercise ordinary care. LA. R.S. 10:4-406(4)
(Supp. 1974); UCC § 4-406(4).
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covered the forgeries or alterations by the exercise of reason-
able care and promptness. 152 For the individual depositor,
thirty days seems a reasonable time within which to discover
and report such items, even where the forgery or alteration is
skillfully accomplished. The extent to which the promptness
standard may be shortened by agreement depends upon the
courts' view of the § 1-203 obligation of good faith, which
cannot be disclaimed or unreasonably varied.
The time limits provided by the Commercial Laws within
which to act with respect to altered or forged items should be
variable by agreement. 153 In fact, no reason appears why all
time limits imposed by the Commercial Laws cannot be var-
ied, so long as the variance is not manifestly unreasonable, as
those which de facto eliminate the bank's duties or the cus-
tomer's rights. 5 4 For example, it seems permissible to vary
the six-months "staleness" time period under § 4-404, at least
to the extent that no attempt to disclaim negligence liability
is involved, since the provision is basically protective of the
bank anyway. 155
CONCLUSION
The key consideration prompting the latitude granted
banks under § 4-103 is the desire to provide flexibility so that
the law governing commercial transactions will be simplified
and modernized, while permitting the "continued expansion
of commercial practices through . . . agreement of the par-
ties."'1 56 This flexibility rests, however, upon the realization
that it would be unwise to freeze present collection methods
by inflexible statutory rules, in view of the technical complex-
ity involved, the great number of items handled in the collec-
tion process and the possibility that new and improved
methods of collections will be developed to speed the pro-
cess. 15 7 The issue, then, in each case should be: does the
variation attempt to disclaim any non-disclaimable obliga-
152. LA. R.S. 10:4-406(1) (Supp. 1974).
153. CLARK & SQUILLANTE at 14-15. See New York Credit Men's Adjust-
ment Bureau, Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 41 A.D.2d 912, 343
N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1973).
154. CLARK & SQUILLANTE at 14-15.
155. Id. at 31-32. Squillante suggests it could not be cut below thirty
days.
156. LA. R.S. 10:1-102(2) (Supp. 1974).
157. UCC § 4-103, Comment 1.
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tions or responsibilities of the bank, and if not, to what extent
should it be enforceable absent some compelling evidence
that the collection system will thereby be improved? Such
evidence should relate to the volume of items handled, in-
creasingly complex technical advances or some other jus-
tification related to the "flexibility" premise outlined in
Comment 1 to § 4-103.
It is doubtful that rights and liabilities expressly pro-
vided in the Commercial Laws can be varied. Even though a
bank could demonstrate, for example, that an unforeseeable
and unpreventable computer breakdown caused a wrongful
dishonor, disclaimer of liability for such dishonor should be
unenforceable since the cause of action is expressly granted
by § 4-402.158 The Commercial Laws also expressly grant the
right to stop payment of any item payable for the customer's
account and moreover to do so orally. 159 Banks, then, face two
hurdles in their attempts to vary the effect of § 4-403: first,
that the right is expressly given by the statute, and second,
that payments over valid oral stop orders have an aura of
negligence 160 about them, which, of course, cannot be dis-
claimed. The fact that § 4-403 requires the customer to affirm
the order within 14 days for further effectiveness provides an
argument against variance. 1'6
In the area of properly payable items, banks and their
customers may have more flexibility. Liability for payment of
post-dated or conditional checks prior to date or to fulfillment
of the condition perhaps cannot be disclaimed since it would
be difficult to show any reason other than negligence for
paying such items, but the customer could agree that condi-
tional and post-dated checks, as "counter" or "universal"
checks, are not to be drawn at all, and that, if drawn, no
liability shall attach to their handling. Several factors sup-
port such an agreement: first, unlike wrongful dishonor, the
customer is given no express right under Chapter 4 to draw a
post-dated or conditional check;' 62 second, conditional and
158. CLARK & SQUILLANTE at 14.
159. LA. R.S. 10:4-403 (Supp. 1974); UCC § 4-403.
160. This is the view of the court in Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank, 376 Pa.
181, 101 A.2d 910 (1954).
161. CLARK & SQUILLANTE at 15.
162. Under LA. R.S. 10:3-114 (Supp. 1974), post-dating a check does not
make it non-negotiable, but non-negotiability is largely irrelevant to the
issue of whether an item is properly payable.
1975]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
post-dated checks are not compatible with modern methods of
collection designed to facilitate speedy movement and han-
dling of items; third, the customer has available alternative
methods by which to achieve his purpose, including the draw-
ing of a draft on his bank, rather than a check, 16 3 or by
issuing a promissory note payable at his bank.16 4
On the other hand, altered items and items bearing
forgeries of the signature of the drawer, maker, or of indors-
ers are subject- to an allocation of loss scheme under the
Commercial Laws which probably cannot be varied. 16 5 Even
though banks have no meaningful way to prevent payment,
such items are also usually outside the control of the cus-
tomer; to the extent the customer has control over such
items, the Commercial Laws provide him the right to stop
payment, or provide an allocation of loss based not on the
negligence of the bank but on the negligence of the customer.
To the extent that the allocation of loss scheme of the Com-
mercial Laws is keyed to timely notification as in § 4-406, time
limits can, under New York Credit,16 6 be shortened, so long as
the basic right of the customer to avail himself of the right
granted is preserved, and so long as no de facto attempt by
the bank to avoid negligence is involved, since a speeding up
of the collection process is the result.
Chapter 4 of the Commercial Laws, as a faithful adoption
of Article 4 of the UCC, was drafted with the problems, needs,
and desires of bankers in mind. Particularly is this the case
with respect to the bank-customer provisions of §§ 4-401-407.
Bank interests receive great protection while few conces-
sions, largely illusory, are made to the customer. 167 Section
4-103(1) is consistent with such a scheme. The courts should
163. See LA. R.S. 10:3-104(2)(a) & (b) (Supp. 1974).
164. Under LA. R.S. 10:3-121 (Supp. 1974), the bank will ask the drawer
for instructions as to payment.
165. See LA. R.S. 10:3-404-07, 3-417-19, 4-207 (Supp. 1974). See generally
CLARK & SQUILLANTE at 1-16.
166. 41 A.D.2d 912, 343 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1973). See text following
note 145, supra.
167. LA. R.S. 10:4-402 (Supp. 1974) (wrongful dishonor) and LA. R.S.
10:4-403 (Supp. 1974) (right to stop payment) are examples of the illusion.
Both protections are based on a showing of damages or loss resulting from
the bank's wrongful action in paying or dishonoring, a very difficult assign-
ment for the non-merchant customer. See text at notes 41-53, 85-94, supra.
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therefore proceed cautiously in this area, for while the scope
of § 4-103(1) is difficult to define, it was not intended that
facilitation of the collection process be used as a guise for
imposing unconscionable bank-customer agreements on the
public.
